

Message Text

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TO AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
AMEMBASSY LUSAKA
AMEMBASSY PRETORIA

S E C R E T STATE 193712

NODIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: RH, TZ

SUBJECT: RHODESIA: CLARIFYING PLANS FOR THE ARMED FORCES

1. ASSISTANT SECRETARY MOOSE AND AF/S DIRECTOR PETTERSON
WILL BE ARRIVING LONDON 0830 AUGUST 16 (PAN AM 106) FOR
TALKS WITH JOHNNY GRAHAM AND OTHERS AT FCO CONCERNING
CLARIFICATIONS NEEDED TO GET PRESIDENT NYERERE TO CALL
MEETING OF FRONT LINE PRESIDENTS TO HEAR UK-US PROPOSALS
ON RHODESIA. PLEASE PASS FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM MOOSE TO
GRAHAM OUTLINING PROBLEM.

A. PRESIDENT NYERERE'S COMMENTS ON PRESIDENT CARTER'S
LETTER OF AUGUST 15 AND JOSHUA NKOMO'S CONVERSATION WITH
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SECRETARY VANCE THIS MORNING POINT UP THE NEED FOR FURTHER
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B. OUR RECENT EMPHASIS ON THE NEED TO HAVE AN EFFECTIVE
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C. IN ASKING FOR CLARIFICATION REGARDING THIS ASPECT OF THE UK-US PROPOSALS, NYERERE SEEMS TO BE ASKING FOR GREATER SPECIFICITY CONCERNING WHICH UNITS OF THE RHODESIAN FORCES WOULD BE RETAINED AND UNDER WHAT COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS. SINCE IT WAS AGREED IN WASHINGTON THAT PRIMARY RELIANCE FOR PEACEKEEPING ASSISTANCE WOULD BE PLACED ON A UN FORCE -- AFTER THE POLICE -- NYERERE ALSO SEEMS TO BE
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FOR DR. BRZEZINSKI ONLY

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G. OUR AMBASSADOR IN DAR ES SALAAM PUSHED AS HARD AS HE COULD FOR A MEETING THIS WEEK. NYERERE DID NOT FORECLOSE THE POSSIBILITY, BUT EMPHASIZED THAT HE DID NOT FEEL THAT THE CONDITIONS WERE READY YET TO ENSURE THAT THE MATTER WOULD BE PROPERLY HANDLED. HE INDICATED THAT HE COULD ALSO BENEFIT FROM A LITTLE MORE TIME TO GET HIS COLLEAGUES QUOTE READY UNQUOTE AND THAT HE WOULD CLEARLY FEEL MORE COMFORTABLE WITH A MEETING AFTER THE LAGOS CONFERENCE. WHILE NOTING THAT NYERERE IS CAPABLE OF MAKING VERY, VERY FINE DISTINCTIONS IN THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS, OUR AMBASSADOR EXPRESSED THE BELIEF THAT HE IS SINCERE AND THAT IF SOMETHING CAN BE DONE TO WIN HIS CONFIDENCE REGARDING THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR HANDLING THE ARMED FORCES QUESTION, NYERERE WOULD LIVE UP TO HIS PROMISES.

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FOR AMBASSADOR YOUNG FROM ASST SEC MOOSE

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SALAAM LUSAKA PRETORIA AUG. 16, 1977 REPEATED TO YOU QUOTE

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TAGS: RH, TZ

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SUBJECT: RHODESIA: CLARIFYING PLANS FOR THE ARMED FORCES

1. ASSISTANT SECRETARY MOOSE AND AF/S DIRECTOR PETTERSON
WILL BE ARRIVING LONDON 0830 AUGUST 16 (PAN AM 106) FOR
TALKS WITH JOHNNY GRAHAM AND OTHERS AT FCO CONCERNING
CLARIFICATIONS NEEDED TO GET PRESIDENT NYERERE TO CALL
MEETING OF FRONT LINE PRESIDENTS TO HEAR UK-US PROPOSALS
ON RHODESIA. PLEASE PASS FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM MOOSE TO
GRAHAM OUTLINING PROBLEM.

A. PRESIDENT NYERERE'S COMMENTS ON PRESIDENT CARTER'S
LETTER OF AUGUST 15 AND JOSHUA NKOMO'S CONVERSATION WITH

SECRETARY VANCE THIS MORNING POINT UP THE NEED FOR FURTHER CLARIFICATION OF THOSE PARTS OF OUR PROPOSALS WHICH DEAL WITH THE ARMED FORCES AND A UN PEACEKEEPING ROLE.

B. OUR RECENT EMPHASIS ON THE NEED TO HAVE AN EFFECTIVE FORCE FOR THE RESIDENT COMMISSIONER TO CALL UPON IN THE EVENT OF ANY DISTURBANCES DURING THE TRANSITION PERIOD APPEARS TO BE THE PRINCIPAL CAUSE OF NYERERE'S PRESENT AGITATION. WE HAVE EMPHASIZED THAT THE RESIDENT COMMISSIONER WOULD BE ABLE TO CALL UPON ELEMENTS OF THE REGULAR RHODESIAN FORCES TOGETHER WITH ANY UN, COMMONWEALTH

OR OTHER FORCES THAT MIGHT BE AVAILABLE TO SUPPLEMENT HIS PRIMARY RELIANCE UPON THE POLICE FOR MAINTAINING LAW AND ORDER. THIS EMPHASIS HAS CAUSED PRESIDENT NYERERE TO FOCUS AFTER THE QUESTION OF THE STATUS OF THE RHODESIAN FORCES DURING THE TRANSITION PERIOD, ESPECIALLY SINCE IT IS HIS POSITION THAT NOT ONLY SMITH BUT ALSO SMITH'S ARMY MUST GO UPON THE TRANSFER OF POWER TO A BRITISH RESIDENT COMMISSIONER. WHILE NYERERE HAS AGREED TO THE PRESENCE IN RHODESIA DURING THE TRANSITION OF ACCEPTABLE
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"ELEMENTS" FROM THE PREVIOUS RHODESIAN FORCES, IT IS CLEAR THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO SEE SOME KIND OF DEMOBILIZATION PLAN FOR THOSE FORCES. HIS USE OF THE TERM "ELEMENTS" MAY ALSO BE MORE RESTRICTIVE THAN OUR INTERPRETATION.

C. IN ASKING FOR CLARIFICATION REGARDING THIS ASPECT OF THE UK-US PROPOSALS, NYERERE SEEMS TO BE ASKING FOR GREATER SPECIFICITY CONCERNING WHICH UNITS OF THE RHODESIAN FORCES WOULD BE RETAINED AND UNDER WHAT COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS. SINCE IT WAS AGREED IN WASHINGTON THAT PRIMARY RELIANCE FOR PEACEKEEPING ASSISTANCE WOULD BE PLACED ON A UN FORCE -- AFTER THE POLICE -- NYERERE ALSO SEEMS TO BE SEEKING CONFIRMATION THAT THERE WILL INDEED BE A UN FORCE.

D. ACCORDINGLY, BEFORE WE CAN GET NYERERE TO CALL A MEETING OF THE FRONT LINE STATES TO HEAR THE UK-US PROPOSALS, WE BELIEVE IT WILL BE NECESSARY FOR US TO WORK OUT THIS PROBLEM AND GIVE HIM A CLEARER PICTURE OF WHAT WE HAVE IN MIND.

2. AS FURTHER BACKGROUND YOU MAY PASS FOLLOWING REPORT ON PRESIDENT NYERERE'S COMMENTS ON LETTER SENT TO HIM BY PRESIDENT CARTER CONCERNING THE UK-US PROPOSALS. (FYI. THIS IS SANITIZED VERSION OF REPORT FROM EMBASSY DAR, COPY OF WHICH HAS ALSO BEEN PROVIDED IN THIS FORM TO BRITISH EMBASSY WASHINGTON.)

A. SUMMARY. PRESIDENT NYERERE MORNING AUGUST 15 RECEIVED PRESIDENT CARTER'S LETTER VERY WARMLY. HE EMPHASIZED THAT GUT ISSUE WAS WHAT WILL BE DONE NOT ONLY ABOUT SMITH BUT ABOUT SMITH'S ARMY. HE AGREES UNCONDITIONALLY WITH STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLE ON THIS SUBJECT CONTAINED PRESIDENT CARTER'S LETTER, BUT HE DOES NOT FEEL HE CAN CALL HIS FRONT LINE COLLEAGUES TOGETHER UNTIL THERE IS CLARIFICATION FROM THE BRITISH ON EXACTLY WHAT THEY INTEND TO DO WITH SMITH'S ARMY. MEANWHILE, HE WILL HAVE HIS FOREIGN MINISTER
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BEGIN PREPARING FOR A MEETING OF THE FRONT LINE PRESIDENTS. NYERERE REITERATED HIS PROMISE TO PRESIDENT CARTER TO CALL A MEETING TO HEAR OWEN AND AMBASSADOR YOUNG AS SOON AS CLARIFICATION IS OBTAINED, BUT FEELS TIMING WILL PROBABLY HAVE TO BE AFTER RATHER THAN BEFORE THE LAGOS CONFERENCE.

B. PRESIDENT NYERERE SAID PRESIDENT CARTER'S LETTER CONFIRMED THAT HE AND CARTER HAD UNDERSTOOD EACH OTHER. SPECIFICALLY, NYERERE AGREED THAT THE PRESENCE IN RHODESIA DURING THE TRANSITION PERIOD OF ACCEPTABLE ELEMENTS FROM THE PREVIOUS RHODESIAN FORCES WAS AGREEABLE TO HIM (TOGETHER, OF COURSE, WITH UN OR COMMONWEALTH FORCES, AND LIBERATION FORCES WHICH WILL BE BASE OF ARMY OF INDEPENDENT ZIMBABWE.)

C. PRESIDENT NYERERE EXPRESSED CONCERN AT THE APPARENT ABSENCE OF ANY SPECIFIC PLAN REGARDING THE NUMBER OF RHODESIAN FORCES TO BE RETAINED, NOTING THAT FOREIGN SECRETARY OWEN HAD NOT GONE BEYOND SAYING THAT THEY WOULD GET RID OF THE SELOUS SCOUTS IMMEDIATELY. NYERERE SAID HE NEEDS TO KNOW THAT THE UK IS GOING TO DO MUCH MORE THAN THAT. HE WAS CONCERNED THAT ALTHOUGH THE UK EXPRESSED A SENSE OF URGENCY, IT SPOKE OF NEEDING TIME TO WORK THINGS OUT. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, NYERERE IS RELUCTANT TO CALL A MEETING OF THE FRONT LINE STATES UNTIL SOMETHING MUCH MORE SPECIFIC CAN BE SAID ON THE QUESTION OF ARMED FORCES.

D. ASSUMING THAT SOME ELEMENTS OF SMITH'S ARMY WILL BE INCORPORATED INTO A NEW FORCE, NYERERE ARGUED THAT THE UK COULD NOT ALONE DETERMINE WHICH ELEMENTS AND HOW MANY, BUT WOULD HAVE TO AGREE WITH THE QUOTE LIBERATION AND UN OR COMMONWEALTH FORCES COMMANDER. UNQUOTE ALL THREE FORCES
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WOULD BE PRESENT ON TRANSITION DAY ONE, BUT THE FIRST ORDER OF BUSINESS FOR TRANSITION DAY TWO AND SUBSEQUENTLY MUST BE TO GET THE NEGATIVE ELEMENTS OF SMITH'S ARMY (NOT JUST THE SELOUS SCOUTS) OUT OF THE WAY. NYERERE SAID HE DID NOT NEED TO KNOW ALL OF THE DETAILS BUT HE AND HIS ASSOCIATES MUST HAVE CONFIDENCE THAT THE UK DOES NOT INTEND FOR SMITH'S ARMY TO LAST THROUGHOUT THE TRANSITION PERIOD BECAUSE, IF IT DOES, INDEPENDENCE -- EVEN WITHOUT SMITH -- WILL NOT BE REAL. NYERERE IS CONCERNED AT THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE SMITH ARMY COULD BE SEEN AS PERSISTING THROUGHOUT THE TRANSITION PERIOD.

E. NYERERE SAID THAT HE WOULD CALL HIS COLLEAGUES TOGETHER IMMEDIATELY UPON RECEIPT OF A MESSAGE ASSURING HIM THAT THE BRITISH DO INDEED (A) INTEND AND (B) KNOW HOW TO DISMANTLE SMITH'S ARMY SO THAT IT PROMPTLY LOSES THE POWER TO CONTROL EVENTS. HE WOULD PREFER RECEIVING SUCH A CLARIFICATION DIRECTLY FROM THE BRITISH.

F. AS SOON AS HE GETS THE NEEDED CLARIFICATION OF THE BRITISH POSITION, NYERERE WOULD CONVENE A FRONT LINE

PRESIDENTS' MEETING TO HEAR SECRETARY OWEN AND AMBASSADOR YOUNG, ALTHOUGH HE THINKS THAT THIS WOULD BE MORE LIKELY TO OCCUR AFTER RATHER THAN BEFORE THE LAGOS CONFERENCE. MEANWHILE, FOREIGN MINISTER MKAPA WILL GET IN TOUCH WITH THE OTHER FRONT LINE STATES AND BEGIN PREPARATIONS. MKAPA WILL TELL THE OTHERS OF NYERERE'S INTENTION AND SAY HE IS AWAITING CLARIFICATION ON A FEW POINTS.

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Decaption Note:
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Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
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Status: NATIVE
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TAGS: PDEV, MPOL, RH, TZ, SF, (NYERERE, JULIUS K), (CARTER, JIMMY)
To: LONDON DAR ES SALAAM MULTIPLE
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